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The starting point of this study is the idea that the 
process of transmitting an experience, by recording mem-
ory and testimony, is a way to re-establish the relationship 
between subject and culture when a situation of violence 
has hindered the subject’s possibilities of representing him-
self in a given time and space. Transmission is an opera-
tor that suspends the rigidity of the times, connecting past, 
present and future, besides restoring a place to those who 
have been violently displaced from themselves.
We propose to reflect on the foundations of a psy-
choanalytic theory of transmission of experiences of vio-
lence guided by an investigation of essays by Sigmund 
Freud. As a result, this basis leads us to question the very 
relationship established between the terms “subject” and 
“culture.” These are terms that cannot be considered of 
equal value – as identical terms – nor can they be repre-
sented in opposition to each other – as mutually exclusive 
terms – as if the subject could be separated from culture, 
becoming independent from the historical and social con-
ditions in which he finds himself. Considering subject and 
culture as overlapping structures, different and indissolu-
ble, reinforces the idea that subjective processes cannot be 
isolated from social events, nor can the latter be removed 
from the sphere of the individual acts of each subject.
Thus, we understand that time and space are more 
than a priori forms of sensitive knowledge of the world, nor 
are they cognitive structures that remain stable throughout 
life – as affirmed by the tradition of Kantian philosophy, 
which follows the proposals of Immanuel Kant (1781/2001) 
in the work Critique of Pure Reason, in its Transcendental 
Aesthetic. On the contrary, we believe that the dimensions 
of time and space are conditions for the subject to repre-
sent himself developed through social ties. And, in this 
sense, the concept of drive is essential to this bonding of 
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the subject with the other. Moreover, the violence to which 
we referred results from the attempted annihilation of a 
subject’s spatiotemporal references, such as can happen in 
the obliteration of his memory and history, his imprison-
ment and incarceration in prisons, mental hospitals and de-
tention centers, his forced dispossession through exile and 
migration processes. The transmission of these experiences 
happens as a necessary resistance of the subject, restoring 
him to a world where he can represent himself before oth-
ers. In this context we shall see that, based on concepts 
of Freudian psychoanalytic theory, the subject organizes 
himself via unique representations of space and time that 
narrate his history and identify him in a place.
We seek to develop our idea through psychoanalyt-
ical texts also as a way to advance the applications of this 
theory, which is sometimes limited to merely considering 
the subject in his individuality, without addressing situa-
tions in which the subject is erased by violence emanating 
from those who should acknowledge him. Thus, avoiding 
the errors and dangers of viewing the subject as sepa-
rated from the community, we contribute psychoanalyti-
cal concepts to support the understanding of the psychic 
processes that occur in subjects who have suffered some 
kind of violence.
Generally speaking, we regard transmission as an 
operation that inscribes a loss. This loss affects both the 
one who transmits the experience, be it a trauma or not, and 
the one that receives what is transmitted, who must take 
responsibility for what is done with it. Such responsibil-
ity implies appropriating what is received, marking it with 
something that is unique to the recipient. Thus, the one that 
transmits must relinquish his ownership of the experience. 
But the loss inscribed in the transmission affects both: the 
one that transmits, in bequeathing a production to the oth-
er, and the one that receives, who must be able to perform 
a twist on what has been transmitted.
It should be stressed that the transmission, by 
launching a past experience to a future time, leads to the 
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effect of loss through a twist on what is being transmit-
ted. That means that something is transformed in the act 
of transmitting, so that when a transmission has occurred, 
what has been transmitted is found in an altered state. As 
we shall see below, we believe that the operation of trans-
mission follows the structure of the drive circuit, in that 
the drive connects the subject to the other in forwarding 
the loss of an object. Thus, the one who transmits must 
renounce the intimacy with his experience and the one who 
receives should be able to do so by socially recognizing 
that transmitted heritage.
Thus, this paper is organized into four stages, using 
as main points of reflection the relationship between the 
following signifiers: time, violence and transmission. In 
what way does the relationship between each one of these 
terms allow us to reflect, from a psychoanalytic viewpoint, 
on the processes of violence suffered by subjects and the 
transmission of this experience as a necessary effect for 
their re-establishment? To find out, our starting point 
was the development of the concept of culture in Freud. 
In “time and transmission,” based on the introduction of 
the drive concept, we see that the obstruction of its circuit 
leads to the flattening of space-time and the disruption of 
social ties. In “time and violence” we will see that an expe-
rience of violence may result from the subject settling in a 
certain position of the drive circuit, and, in “violence and 
transmission” we analyze transmission as an ethics of the 
duty of transmitting.
Culture and transmission
Knowing that a culture cannot exist without the 
transmission of legacies, we considered the establishment 
of culture, according to Freud, based on two moments, as 
developed in Totem and Taboo (1913/2003a). In this es-
say, Freud formulates an original myth in which he recog-
nizes murder as the constitutive act of human condition. 
However, with this fiction, he reminds us that a violent act 
cannot be considered as such in itself, but only in the con-
text in which it is inserted. In this sense, the violent dimen-
sion of an act occurs when it annihilates the possibilities 
of the subject representing himself in his spatiotemporal 
dimensions. The father’s murder by the brothers of the pri-
mal horde is not an act of violence, inasmuch as it is the 
foundation of social ties. It is an act that introduces the tem-
porality of the subject and establishes the spatial limits of 
movement, thus breaking with the logic of pure repetition 
of the same which prevailed before.
To define the concept of culture, Freud creates an 
original myth drawing on the hypothesis by which the 
theory of evolution attempts to explain the conditions of 
the primal social state of humanity. The deduction is that 
primitive man lived in small hordes, in which sexual rela-
tions were forbidden due to the jealousy of the eldest male 
dominating the group. Each member was driven out to 
form his own horde, where he could assure the domination 
and prohibition of sexual intercourse.
To this, Freud (1913/2003a) adds:
One day, the brothers who had been driven out 
came back together, killed and devoured their fa-
ther, thus making an end of the patriarchal horde. 
United, they had the courage to do and succeeded 
in doing what would have been impossible for them 
to do individually. (p. 1838)
The myth of the primitive horde harks back to a 
time when there was no overlap between individual and 
collective, between subject and other. For this distinction 
to happen, breaking with the continuum of pure repetition, 
a loss must be inscribed in this totaled collective, a loss 
which is introduced by the father’s murder.
This crime resulted from the feeling of hostility and 
revenge against the one who imposed on them a series of 
prohibitions, and stemmed from the envy and admiration of 
each one of the brothers of the horde, inasmuch as the father, 
besides being an oppressive force, was also a protective 
figure in the tribe. This act was followed by helplessness, 
vulnerability, and, especially, a void caused by the absence 
of horde’s father. Here we have the feeling of ambivalence – 
love and hate – as an element of the social condition which 
marks the inscription of the subject in the fraternal ties.
If before the father’s murder the presence of a tyran-
nical figure forced the totalized collectivity into oppression 
before his wishes and demands, that power nevertheless 
preserved order compared to the chaos of war of all against 
all that his absence could cause. Faced with the real pos-
sibility of self-destruction of the horde and the fear of re-
turning to the previous state in the absence of the father, 
the members of the horde were forced to identify with each 
other and conceive notions such as justice and equality. 
Those paternal badges relate to the universal impossibility 
of reaching that place that could only be occupied by the 
father himself.
Thus we understand that the definition of culture, 
as presented by Freud in the myth of Totem and Taboo, is 
not established in a single moment. In addition to this first 
moment, of the father’s murder, a second moment is nec-
essary to uphold the existence of the collectivity and thus 
establish the ties that form the social structure. According 
to Freud, the father’s murder was followed by a ritual of 
cannibalism – the totemic banquet – in which all members 
of the horde devour his body. This cannibalism marked 
symbolically “the repetition and the celebration of this 
memorable and criminal deed, which was the beginning of 
so many things: of social organization, of moral restrictions 
and of religion” (Freud, 1913 / 2003a, p 1838). Therefore, 
we understand that to Freud, the formation of culture is 
defined by the effects of a founding act. On the one hand, 
the creation of totems allowed all members of the group to 
be, from their individual positions, linked to each other. 
And the taboos therein formed, in turn, played the role of 
primitive laws, since they prohibited the repetition of this 
inaugurating act of culture.
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The totems give rise to ideals, they harbor the same 
feelings of ambivalence that were directed toward the fa-
ther. With them is created the ideal figure of the ego, with 
which all children identity, i.e., a trait of the father is as-
sumed to support an ego. In the essay On Narcissism: an 
introduction, from 1914, Freud writes about idealization as 
a process of glorification and exaltation of an object that 
can be shared among many. He says: “The ego ideal uncov-
ers an important overview for the understanding of group 
psychology. In addition to its individual aspect, this ideal 
has its social aspect; it also constitutes the common ideal of 
a family, a class or a nation” (Freud, 1914 / 2003b, p. 2033).
The ego ideal is the prolongation of the feeling of 
love that the subject has for the other as the one who repre-
sents what the subject previously was, what he would like 
to be, or what he wishes. The father’s death produces a void 
of a relationship of ambivalence that no longer exists. The 
ego ideal retrieves this relationship marked by the ambiva-
lence of love and hate, between wanting to be the father, 
since he is an object of admiration, and wanting his death, 
since he is an object of envy and rivalry.
As a result, finding a trait of this figure in the other, 
as an ideal, means reencountering a lost link in a differ-
ent way. We can love and hate the ideal, just as the father 
was loved and hated. Psychoanalyst Ana Costa links the 
identifications to the ideal and to prohibition to the no-
tion of the double. She recalls that identification breeds 
aggressiveness. The ambivalent feelings of identification 
lead to the need to simultaneously preserve and annul the 
other, as a mirror (identity) that sustains the ego and as an 
appropriation of the trait that organizes the unit (Costa, 
1998, p. 69). On the other hand, the condition of exclu-
sion cannot be fulfilled, inasmuch as, in the duplication of 
oneself into an ideal, states the author, “it is the ‘you’ that 
supports the ‘I’: if one disappears, the other fades away” 
(Costa, 2001, p. 95). Through the ideal, the subject loves 
what he once was and is no more, or what possesses the 
qualities he has never had.
Considering totem disconnected from taboo makes 
us represent models of social organizations taken to ex-
tremes. The transmission of culture is then reduced to the 
repetition of the same. Totem without taboo is the return to 
the father’s tyranny. It is the marginalization of all under 
the rule of the individuality of one. That brings to mind 
totalitarian systems, insofar as at least one is not governed 
by the same order of the collective. It is Colonel Kurtz in 
Joseph Conrad’s book Heart of Darkness (1902/2008). In 
the story, the character Marlow journeys deep into the 
African jungle in search of the missing Colonel Kurtz, 
who had abandoned his military post and assumed the role 
of God among an uncivilized tribe, controlling it through 
the moral of horror. Taboo without totem is the letter of 
the empty law, the law in itself. It is the absence of a sub-
ject’s trait, in reference to which it becomes applicable. It 
is the bureaucratic processes, which erase the uniqueness 
of the differences in the machinery of the generalizable. 
An example is the character of the short story Bartleby, the 
Scrivener (1853/2003), by Herman Melville, who avoids be-
ing abducted by this system of pure repetition of the same. 
One day, Bartleby, a clerk in a Wall Street office, refuses 
to share in the imperative that the logic of bureaucracy im-
poses on him. He starts replying to his boss always in the 
same way: “I would prefer not to.”
The transmission of culture is therefore consoli-
dated in the symbolic repetition of this real act, the murder 
of the father. It is not an act of violence, since it gave rise 
to the social ties and allowed the subjects, who were previ-
ously conditioned to the repetition of the same, to represent 
themselves distinctively in a given space and time. Thus, 
Freud shows us that the transmission of culture happens in 
two moments, providing the conditions for the establish-
ment of the social ties of the subject and preventing him 
from falling into a condition of isolation.
However, we must consider that culture, as the 
foundation of social relations, is the effect of the establish-
ment of a place of exception. It is an outside the rule which 
actually makes its own rule, i.e., a set can only be defined 
as such to the extent that something – that individual with 
absolute power, the father – has been excluded from it, thus 
delimitating its boundaries. This outside is the internal law 
of social organization. And the transmission is the prin-
ciple that transforms the totalizing element into an order-
ing element, a process of re-inscribing an impossible which 
makes social relations possible.
Time and transmission
According to Freud (1913/2003a), an act can only 
be considered violent in relation to the context in which it 
is inserted. In this sense, the murder of the father by the 
brothers of the primal horde is a founding act and not an 
act of violence. It is an act founded on the death wish that 
led the members of the primitive horde to commit parri-
cide, insofar as it establishes the spatiotemporal dimension 
which allows the organization of a phratry. But the death 
wish is a violence when taken by itself, since it breaks up 
the representations that determine a where and when for 
the subject.
That can be seen, for example, in the account of 
former South Africa president Nelson Mandela in his auto-
biography Nelson Mandela: Long Walk to Freedom, of his 
almost 20 years of incarceration on Robben Island, seven 
kilometers distant from Cape Town. Mandela writes:
After the first few months, life settled into a pattern. 
Prison life is about routine: each day like the one 
before, each week like the one before it, so that the 
months and years blend into each other. (Mandela, 
1990, p. 477).
Thus, Mandela narrates how time becomes a weap-
on against the prisoner: “Losing the sense of time is an 
easy way to lose control and even one’s sanity” (Mandela, 
1990, p. 478).
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to situate the primordial place of the subject in relation to 
the other not through activity, i.e., through the unbridled 
pursuit of drive satisfaction, but through the masochistic 
position, that is, the primary position of objectalization. In 
this sense, determining the subject primarily in the condi-
tion of object means inscribing him in the passive place of 
a moment of being marked by the other.
Among the four fates of the drive (Freud, 1915 / 
2003d), namely, (1) reversal into its opposite, (2) turning 
round upon the subject, (3) repression and (4) sublimation, 
we shall draw on the first to formulate the three times for 
the emergence of the subject in the drive circuit. The rever-
sal of a drive into its opposite occurs in two movements: 
(a) the change from activity to passivity and (b) the rever-
sal of its content. The former is found in the reversion of 
opposite pairs (sadism/masochism, gaze/be gazed at) and 
establishes the voices of the drive’s grammar. The second 
movement has a single case, the transformation of love into 
hate, and expands the ambivalence “love versus hatred” to 
three forms of opposition.
To understand the circuit of the positions of activity 
and passivity, let us take the example of drive pair gaze/be 
gazed at. Freud (1915 / 2003d) distinguishes three phases 
of the drive circuit, in the following order: (a) the gaze is 
an activity directed to a foreign object; (B) the object is 
divested and the gaze is directed to the very person; thus, 
there is a change from activity to passivity and the position 
is now of being gazed at; (C) as a result of this shift of posi-
tion, the foreign object becomes the subject of the action, to 
whom the person exhibits himself in order to be gazed at. It 
is the reflexive position of the drive.
In this case, the active purpose of the drive is prior 
to its passive purpose. The gaze, such as the production 
of pain by the sadist, is an activity prior to being gazed at 
and suffering pain. However, according to Freud, solely in 
case of the gazing drive, there is a preliminary stage, prior 
to the first:
The gazing drive is autoerotic at the beginning of 
its activity, that is, although it has an object, it finds 
that object in the subject’s own body. Only later is 
it led (by a process of comparison) to exchange this 
object for one that is analogous to someone else’s 
body (stage a). (Freud, 1915/2003d, p. 2046)
Thus, the drive establishes a where whose origin is 
the space of the body and a time given by the circuit which 
turns towards the other. It can be inferred from this gazing 
drive structure that in the drive circuit, the other is prior to 
the appearance of the subject. The subject’s body is first 
taken to be an object of gazing. In other words, prior to 
being active, prior to gazing, there is a preliminary stage. 
This other person, who gazes at the subject as an object, is 
the condition that allows him to actively position himself 
in relation to the other’s gaze. But for the subject to emerge 
in the drive circuit, he must experience the loss of this pri-
mordial passive position.
The flattening of time – besides space, achieved by 
the incarceration of bodies – was one of the main and sub-
tlest violence strategies used against prisoners on Robben 
Island. There, says Mandela, time moved “glacially,” not 
because one fell into idleness, but because, purposefully, 
the simplest things could take months or years to get done: 
“a request for a new toothbrush might take six months to 
be fulfilled” (Mandela, 1990, p. 478). The challenge for all 
prisoners, therefore, is to survive the violence of the au-
thorities who exploit weaknesses, demolish initiatives and 
negate individualities, “in order to stamp out that spark 
that makes each of us human and each of us who we are 
“(Mandela, 1990, p. 478).
All of this, Mandela tells us, cannot be done alone, 
without the presence of the other: “We supported each 
other and we gained strength from each other. Whatever 
we knew, whatever we learned, we shared and by shar-
ing we multiplied whatever courage we had individually” 
(Mandela, 1990, p. 479).
Mandela was a politician who never lowered him-
self to a position of indifference. As we are reminded by 
Freud (1915/2003d), it is in the bond with otherness that 
the subject emerges. In this sense, any subjective stance 
stems from a stance, whose foundation is ambivalence. 
In the clash of feelings, of love versus hatred and of life 
wish versus death wish, we find the primordial condition 
for the formation of the subject. However, if psychoanaly-
sis assumes that there is no representation of death in the 
unconscious, as Freud states in his essay The Unconscious 
(1915/2003c), this is due to the fact that certain experiences 
imposed on the subject will no longer allow him to consider 
death as the mere opposite of life.
This context imposes a different pair of opposites, 
beyond the antithesis “life versus death,” which requires 
the subject to take responsibility for a stance. It is the an-
tithesis of “love/death versus indifference.” Death presents 
itself as that which relaunches life into a possible future. 
We shall see how this position is formed throughout the 
times of the drive circuit, enabling the subject to manifest 
himself in different places. The drive (expressed in the pair 
life drive and death drive) will be the element that provides 
the subject with the possibilities of representing himself in 
some time and some place.
Being politically indifferent is declining to express 
a preference, it is being in a “neither ... nor” relationship, 
neither for nor against. Indifference is, therefore, the op-
posite of wish and, as such, detaches itself from politics, 
from the field of exchanges and choices. And psychoanal-
ysis is the wish theory that attests that the subject, in his 
unconscious condition, is anything but indifferent. The 
process of culture transmission is an effort to break with 
the position of indifference imposed on the subject by cer-
tain situations of violence.
In Drives and their Fates, Freud (1915/2003d) 
makes the subject represent himself via the temporality 
of the drive circuit. This essay starts to break with the 
logic of the pleasure principle. It outlines a first attempt 
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The times of the drive circuit are therefore struc-
tured according to the rule of language that distinguishes 
the active, passive and reflexive voices. And so the sub-
ject situates himself in the positions according to the drive 
times, such as “to eat,” “to be eaten” and “to make oneself 
be eaten” in the case of the oral drive, or “to gaze,” to be 
gazed at” and “to make oneself be gazed at” in the case of 
the gazing drive. The subject does not appear in the first 
two moments, but only in the full movement of the drive 
circuit, when he returns to the reflexive voice position. 
The moment of subjectivity, therefore, emerges beyond 
the active-passive polarity, in the possibility of the subject 
swaying between one position and another, according to 
his wish, without settling into any one of them. As a result, 
the drive represents a time in the movement of places.
The drive circuit allows us to reflect on the subject’s 
positions. Pleasure can stem from the passive position of 
object (be devoured and be beaten), from the active posi-
tion (devour and beat) or from the reflexive position in rela-
tion to the other (make oneself be eaten or make oneself 
be beaten). Activity, passivity and reflexivity designate the 
subject’s wish positions. But the passage from indifference 
to ambivalence implies taking a stance in face of the losses 
produced by an objectalized position.
The subject disappears when he settles into a spe-
cific position of the drive circuit. The transmission of an 
experience of violence affords rhythm to temporality and 
firmness to space for a subject whose conditions of rep-
resenting himself in a when and where have been broken. 
The game of transmission, therefore, impels the subject 
into the reflexive drive time, which allows him to repo-
sition himself in different times and places. Transmitting 
means putting oneself into circulation and not allowing 
oneself to be reduced to the positions of sufferer and per-
petrator, of object or executioner.
Time and violence
In Totem and Taboo, Freud (1913 / 2003a) started 
developing the first principles of a psychoanalytic theory of 
transmission, to the extent that he investigated for the first 
time, and in greater depth, the relationship between sub-
ject and culture. It is a relationship based on a loss of drive 
satisfaction, the effects of which are felt on both sides of 
the equation. By the subject, with the inscription of social 
rules and norms, and by society, with the reception of am-
bivalent facets of the drive (life and death), which is used 
for its construction. The relationship between the signifiers 
“time” and “violence” shows us how, in extreme situations, 
the subject is placed in a position of destroying himself and 
the social ties. It took the emergence of the war for Freud to 
inscribe the radicalism of this experience in the formation 
of the subject. In the analysis of the essay A Child Is Being 
Beaten (1919/2003F), we shall see that when the subject is 
reduced to a certain position of the drive circuit, he not only 
annuls the conditions of spatiotemporal representation, but 
also suffers the violence of fulfilling the death wish.
The theme of death was never far from Freudian 
propositions, but it gained prominence as of World War I 
(1914-1918). It should be noted that three of Freud’s children 
were sent to fight in World War I: Martin and Ernst fought 
at the front, while Oliver worked as an engineer. Thus, the 
theme of death is gradually considered until becoming es-
tablished in 1920, with the formulation of the death drive as 
one of the main concepts of psychoanalysis.
In Thoughts for the Times on War and death 
(1915/2003e), Freud retrieves issues on death giving the 
testimony of a time of disillusionment at the possibility of 
the disruption of social ties. For centuries wars had served 
as an opportunity to display the power and development of 
each people. However, affirms Freud, “the war in which 
we refused to believe broke out, and brought disillusion-
ment” (Freud, 1915/2003e, p. 2103). World War I had so far 
been the bloodiest, most destructive and cruelest of them 
all. Here is his desolate outburst:
It tramples in blind fury on all that comes in its way 
as though there were to be no future and no peace 
among men after it is over. It severs all common 
bonds between the opposing peoples, and threatens 
to leave a legacy of embitterment that will make 
any renewal of those bonds impossible for a long 
time. (Freud, 1915/2003e, p. 2103)
Illusions are creations of fantasy, form of fiction 
of the encounter with the other. They save us unpleasant 
feelings, allow us to enjoy satisfactions. But the acknowl-
edgment of the ability of “civilized” men to behave natu-
rally with brutality, cruelty and barbarism, as well as the 
moral degradation of peoples and states – which should 
be the custodians of civilization – produced a period of 
disillusionment. In this perspective, the disenchantment 
of this war time suggests that this primordial condition 
of the subject to build ties with the other could somehow 
be broken.
In Totem and Taboo, Freud (1913/2003a) showed 
us that an act is only violent in the context in which it is 
inserted, from which it receives a moral meaning as ei-
ther good or evil. It was the crime against the father of the 
primal horde that enabled the establishment of social ties. 
However, in order to be suspended and not be repeated in 
reality, this crime must be internalized by the brothers of 
the horde and become a wish – the death wish. Thus, death 
can only be psychically inscribed as wish, and, as such, it 
suffers from actions of cultural prohibition that prevent its 
fulfillment. When it is fulfilled, it annihilates its object, 
and therefore, paradoxically, its own condition also.
Therefore, according to Freud, the death wish is 
fulfilled unconsciously, sometimes through altruistic and 
social impulses. The neurotic that fears the death of his be-
loved object defends himself by forming obsessive symp-
toms because he is close to fulfilling his wish to annihilate 
it. In this sense, altruistic feelings are a tradeoff for actual 
selfish attitudes.
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The violence of the crime against the father broke 
with the primal indifference towards the other. And the 
passage from indifference to ambivalence resulted in the 
production of a subject that cannot reduce himself to a 
single position of the drive circuit, but should be able to 
circulate among all of them. When settling in a position, 
he puts his unconscious wish into action, and thus makes it 
impossible to support social ties. The idea of  primary mas-
ochism not only broke with the notion of individualism, by 
indicating the prior existence of the other as a condition for 
the emergence of the subject, but it especially marks the 
social inscription of the subject in the position of the object.
In the 1919 essay A Child Is Being Beaten, Freud 
(2003f) seeks to build the genesis of the phantasm frame-
work through the positions of sadism and masochism. 
The organization of the subject will be structured by the 
identification between “being loved” and “being beaten,” 
by the erogenous pleasure with death. In this essay, Freud 
retrieves the voices of the drive circuit (active, passive 
and reflexive), making them correspond to the temporal-
ity of the establishment of the phantasm, that structure 
that situates the subject’s social ties. Following the for-
mation of the terms of the constitution of the phantasm 
allows us to understand the subject’s place in relation to 
culture and what is transmitted of it. Stagnating into any 
one of these positions tends to the immobilization of so-
cial ties, the withering of the subject and, consequently, 
the production of violence.
In A Child Is Being Beaten, Freud (1919/2003F) 
starts out from the analysis of an unconscious fantasy 
whose outcome includes an impersonal statement: some-
one beats a child. It is interesting to note that Freud uses as 
his title the statement of the fantasy expressed by his pa-
tients: “a child is being beaten” (p 2469). This is the state-
ment of the first stage of the sadomasochistic fantasy. The 
child being beaten in this first scene is never the actual 
subject, but usually a brother or sister. And the author of the 
aggression, in turn, is an adult. The following conclusion 
is therefore reached by whoever is watching the scene: my 
father is beating a child I hate.
This scene is not of a masochistic nature, says 
Freud, since the subject is outside it. Nor could it be called 
properly sadistic, as it is the father who does the action. 
However, the presence of this other child is viewed by the 
subject of the fantasy as a rival, inasmuch as it threatens his 
amorous relationship with his father. And from that point 
of view, the scene is defined as a sadistic, because “the idea 
of  the father beating this hateful child is therefore pleas-
ant” (Freud, 1919/2003F, p. 2470). The sadistic enjoyment 
emerges from the position of the subject as a spectator of 
the scene. And in the equivalence between being beaten 
and being loved, the associated feeling is that “my father 
does not love this child, he loves only me” (Freud, 1919 / 
2003e, p. 2470, italics in original).
In this first stage we already have a ternary rela-
tionship, typical of the Oedipal relationship, in which the 
characters are the author of the fantasy, another child and 
the father. The second stage of this fantasy suffers the 
same twist of the drive’s grammar. It is the passage from 
the active voice to the passive voice, from the position of 
sadism to that of masochism. The person doing the beating 
remains the same, but the one suffering the aggression is 
now the very subject of the fantasy. He abandons the posi-
tion of spectator to enter the scene. And so the subject as-
sumes the following statement: “I am being beaten by my 
father” (Freud, 1919/2003F, p. 2469). This step is formed 
by two characters. To the extent that it he beaten, the child 
transforms what was hate into love: if the father hits him, it 
is because he loves him. The resulting feeling is guilt, one 
of the forms of masochism, along with women’s and chil-
dren’s positions. The boy also feels this female enjoyment 
of being beaten by his father.
Freud asserts that this second stage is the only one 
of an unconscious nature. His patients could not remember 
it and so it could only be identified through constructions 
in analysis sessions. It is a stage marked by ambivalence, 
for, according to Lacan, “there we find this either ... or ..., 
which is critical in the dual relationship” (1956-57/1995, p. 
119). Passivity associated with the erotic function leads to 
masochism as a fundamental position. This time marks the 
enjoyment that emerges in the position of object of desire 
of the other. It is the expression of the subject’s condition 
of alienation.
The third stage ends the twist of the beating fan-
tasy and resembles the first. The subject of the fantasy is 
reduced to the third position, that of observer. For Lacan, 
it is the ultimate form of fantasy, where something is kept, 
memorized, which remains in the subject:
The father figure is surpassed, transposed, evok-
ing the general form of a character in the position 
of beating, omnipotent and despotic, while the ac-
tual subject is presented in the form of the multiple 
children, who no longer have a definite gender, but 
compose a kind of neutral series. (Lacan, 1957-58 / 
1999, p. 247)
Once again, the subject is in the spectator position; 
he just “is gazing.” But now, unlike the first stage, a strong 
sexual desire is aroused. The subject, who is off the scene, 
enjoys the violence of the death wish. The sadistic position 
of the first stage returns, enclosing an impersonal struc-
ture: someone beats a child.
The indeterminacy of the subject of the sentence is 
expressed by the pronoun “someone” and reveals the desub-
jectivation of this statement for all structures. The subject 
remains in the “state of spectator, or simply with an eye on 
things, i.e., of what always characterizes at the limit, at the 
point of the final reduction, every kind of object” (Lacan, 
1956-57/1995, p. 120). What is produced is something that 
goes in the opposite direction of the inflation of the ego.
However, of the three positions stated in the struc-
ture that organizes the phantasm through signifiers that 
situate positions of relationship, the subject – as in the drive 
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circuit – appears only in the third moment, since there he 
is not settled into any position, but may have pleasure 
anywhere in the relationship that he establishes with each 
other. The fact that he has already moved around the other 
positions enables him to transform the pleasure into knowl-
edge. Thus, one who makes himself be beaten knows as 
much about active enjoyment as about passive enjoyment. 
The pleasure of the sadist is enhanced by the knowledge he 
has about the pleasure of the masochist. The one who gazes 
also enjoys through the one that is gazed at.
When the subject settles in any of these positions, 
the phantasm (i.e., his relationship with the other) seeks its 
fulfillment through the very logic of his sentence. Thus, 
establishing a relationship between the voices (active, pas-
sive and reflexive) of the drive circuit and the structure of 
the phantasm framework, the following correspondence 
is achieved: (1) sadism/active voice = my father beats my 
rival (I hate him), (2) masochism passive voice = I am be-
ing beaten by my father (he loves me), (3) sadomasochism/
reflexive voice = someone beats a child.
In the subject’s identification with one of the state-
ments, he will address culture with hatred and aggression 
or as the person who must sacrifice himself for the love 
of the other. Violence, in both cases, presents itself as the 
annulment of the subject. Like the person who destroys the 
social ties through hatred of difference or like the person 
who fades away in a sacrificial position in face of the need 
for love. Therefore, the transmission of culture is obliter-
ated when one of these situations of violence reduces the 
plurality of the subject’s times to a single position.
The confinement of the subject to a given drive 
time produces a condition of violence in his relationship 
with culture. In the article Society and Individual (1993), 
psychoanalyst Contardo Calligaris addresses the unease 
caused by a terrorist attack that put at risk the disappear-
ance of important cultural heritage sites in Florence, Italy. 
For the author, these attacks were forms of destruction of 
the symbolic heritage of a culture, the equivalent to what 
Lacan attributes, for man, as his second death, i.e., the 
symbolic death that follows the actual death of the body.
According to Calligaris, the opposition between in-
dividual and society is a symptom of our culture, for it fol-
lows the principle of individualism, that is, the individual 
as the supreme value. Individualism, in this sense, is the 
disruption of social ties, the stagnation of the subject in a 
given position of the drive circuit. This leads to a death 
wish which is fulfilled as violence to the other, of a culture 
founded on hatred. This validates all expressions of rivalry, 
of aggression, of destruction of difference, branding other-
ness as that which should be obliterated.
What we find in these situations is a strong attempt 
to break with the cultural and popular values  that are trans-
mitted. In a way, it is if the symbolic structure that was 
built up over the decades needed to be destroyed, seeking 
in the outbreak of violence the only form of manifestation. 
That is the hatred we encounter in terrorist attacks, in graf-
fiti defacing buildings and historical monuments, or in the 
erasure of the memories of people who helped to build our 
present time.
On the other hand, in this settlement on the drive 
circuit, the subject is also compelled to express himself in 
a sacrificial way. The violence of the sacrifice imposes on 
the drive contours, limits and constraints for a relation-
ship – between subject and culture – which has not been 
inscribed by a loss. Thus, to the extent that the drive is 
not completed in a circuit, it is the body that becomes the 
object of sacrifice. These are situations in which the body 
is offered to the power of the other, a violence in which the 
body’s objectalization determines the subject as a prop-
erty of others.
Violence and transmission
Terrorist attacks that have destroyed important cul-
tural heritage sites, such as those perpetrated by the Islamic 
State in millenary cities and museums in northern Iraq. 
The kidnapping, torture and disappearance of political 
opponents, as happened during Latin-American dictator-
ships. The obliteration, by society, of the memory of people 
who helped to build the culture of our time. What these dif-
ferent episodes have in common is the violence that breaks 
with the spatiotemporal dimensions in which subjects are 
represented in social ties. The subject fades away in those 
situations, since they flatten temporal succession and re-
duce to zero the spatial dimensions by which he is able to 
represent himself. We believe that one way of reconstruct-
ing the social ties of the subject who has undergone such an 
experience is through his transmissions.
Loss is an operator that produces a twist in the re-
lationship between subject and culture, causing the experi-
ences transmitted from one term to the other to occur in 
an altered way. This twist, in turn, marks the transmission 
that happens not as the preservation of the past throughout 
time, but as a re-inscription that projects to the future the 
possibilities of creating something new.
In this perspective, Freud’s essay A Child Is Being 
Beaten (1919/2003F) introduced us to the temporality of 
the drive in the construction of the subject’s social ties in 
the phantasm framework. The main idea is that the subject 
appears at the moment of desubjectivation, that is, when 
the ego decentralizes itself from its imaginary position and 
transforms the loss of a pleasure into knowledge about it. 
At this moment of impersonality, in which the ego moves 
away from the objectalized position and restores himself as 
a subject of wish, transmission becomes possible.
The reversals undergone by psychoanalytic theory 
through Freudian insight were mainly based on listening 
to certain clinical phenomena, among which repetition is 
prominent. We cannot say that repetition is a new phenom-
enon for Freud. And Lacan (1985), by recognizing it in his 
1964 seminar as one of the four fundamental concepts of 
psychoanalysis, acutely identified in it the characteristic 
trait of the operation of the unconscious. The temporality 
of repetition as that which insists on returning concerns 
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the constitutive position of the subject and is part of his 
relationship with culture.
Repetition is fundamental, for example, in the es-
say Totem and Taboo (Freud 1913/2003a). The sons who 
murdered the father need to repeat the memory of this 
crime symbolically so that it is never again performed as 
an act. Such repetition occurs through social rituals which 
recall the totemic banquet. Therein lies the paradox of 
repetition. The celebration of the primordial crime is the 
pursuit of a satisfaction. However, to the extent that it is 
repeated, that pleasure is no longer the same. Repetition, in 
this sense, is the effect of a twist in the subject’s position, 
inscribing an impossible in the reencounter of the first ex-
perience of satisfaction.
It was the study of the repeated symptoms of sol-
diers returning from the battlefield that led Freud to clas-
sify war neuroses as a new structure within traumatic 
neuroses. The intensities of these experiences could well 
be a distinguishing factor in relation to the neuroses of civil 
life. The former would be the effect of the actual “death 
risk,” from external sources, while the latter would be 
caused by “amorous frustrations,” due to mishaps of the 
libido. Freud, however, starts wondering whether there is a 
traumatic element at the base of all defensive reaction, in-
asmuch as all symptomatic formations showed a tendency 
to repeat circumstances that caused displeasure.
Since his first psychoanalytic writings, the pleasure 
principle was stipulated as the main rule of the psychic 
system. Its logic is as follows: increased tension generates 
displeasure, while its decrease results in the sensation of 
pleasure. In this sense, stability is a desired state in this 
process. However, Freud recognizes that this principle is 
not hegemonic. The very psychic apparatus, through the 
reality and repression principle, can impose resignations or 
replacements to satisfy certain hedonistic impulses.
Listening to certain symptoms in clinical practice 
contributed to stress the idea of  the repetition compulsion 
as a distinct logic of psychic functioning, contrary to the 
pleasure principle. What is sometimes called fate can be an 
illustration of this process: a person who is always aban-
doned; a man who forms the same kinds of romantic re-
lationships; or even, exemplifies Freud, a woman who has 
been three times married and three times a widow.
If we take into account observations like these, 
based on the behavior, transfer and life stories of 
men and women, we will not only find the cour-
age to assume that there actually exists in the mind 
repetition compulsion that overrides the pleasure 
principle, but will also be inclined to relate to this 
compulsion the dreams occurring in traumatic neu-
roses and the impulse that leads children to play. 
(Freud, 1920 / 2003g, p. 2517)
The real death risk imposed by the situation of war 
re-enhanced, in Freud’s writing, helplessness as the pri-
mordial condition of the subject, a subject that had been 
addressed at the beginning of his work. It is what Freud 
calls fright, a state defined as that of being abruptly in-
vaded in the presence of an unexpected danger, for which 
one is not prepared. This haunting condition of the subject 
helps us to understand why certain children’s games and 
certain stories, which narrate intense horror scenes with 
scary characters, provoke so much fascination among chil-
dren and adults.
It was in this perspective that Freud gave attention 
to the game that his grandson repeatedly played. This child 
had the habit of grabbing and throwing away from him, 
into a corner, under the bed, any object he was able to get. 
At the same time as he threw the objects, he would utter 
with pleasure and satisfaction a long sound, o-o-o-o, repre-
senting, according to Freud, the word fort, which means far.
One day, Freud observed this child playing with a 
reel tied to a piece of string. His game now consisted of 
flinging the reel beneath his bed, making it disappear. The 
sound o-o-o-o was likewise uttered. But instead of going 
to fetch it, the child pulled the string from under of bed, 
demonstrating great satisfaction at the reappearance of the 
object by uttering the sound da, “here.” This is the well-
known game of fort-da, introduced in the essay Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle (1920/2003g). That observation 
motivates reflections that go beyond the understanding of 
children’s games, in that it questions the condition of trans-
mitting an experience of violence. As Freud states, that 
game is “the great cultural achievement of the child” (p. 
2513). Freud’s interest in that children’s game comes from 
wondering why a child would repeat a scene that is un-
pleasant for him. What we shall see is that the only reason 
why the action that leads the child to play with the reel does 
not become an act of violence is that the child is able to 
transmit this experience of neglect through play, twisting 
his place in relation to the other.
Freud’s interpretation of this game is not compli-
cated. The child was acting out, through the objects, the 
disappearance of his mother, felt as unpleasant. “When 
the child moves on from the passivity of the experience to 
the activity of a game, he transfers the unpleasant experi-
ence to one of his playmates, and thus takes revenge on a 
substitute” (Freud, 1920/2003g, p. 2513). The experience 
of separation that the child was suffering passively was 
repeated actively in the game. Added to this is a some-
what destructive impulse to throw the objects away, re-
moving them from sight.
In the seminar “The Anguish” (Lacan, 1962-1963 
/ 2005), the interpretation of the fort-da game is taken up 
by Lacan in a very different way. For Lacan, this game is 
a response to the void left over from the disappearance of 
the mother. The fort-da game inscribes a temporality and 
a space between the subject and the other that allows him 
to participate in the drive circuit ordered by language. The 
reel is an object that is detached from the child’s body, but 
is still tied to it by a string. We are at a moment in which the 
drive object connects the child and mother in a common 
body, starting to present itself in its symbolic dimension.
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In the seminar “The Four Fundamental Concepts of 
Psychoanalysis,” Lacan (1964/1985) reveals his departure 
from Freud’s interpretation: “To say that for the subject it 
is simply a matter of establishing a function of domination 
is nonsense” (p 226). Viewing the children’s game as the 
child’s obstruction to the mother’s disappearance, becom-
ing an agent of the scene, is secondary. The basic differ-
ence in relation to the first interpretation is that the reel is 
no longer seen as representing the mother, but that which 
stands out from her, as an object of satisfaction that was 
lost. Lacan states: “He exercises himself with the help of a 
small reel, that is, with object a” (1964/1985, p 226). Object 
a is this drive object, which, for being the first to mark the 
experience of satisfaction, remains forever lost in encoun-
ters with subsequent objects. In this sense, the reel is the 
symbolic element that establishes the temporal dimension 
of the subject, marked by an alternation of presence and 
absence, of activity and passivity.
The game of fort-da reveals the construction of 
time in the severing operation in which the subject emerges 
as the effect of the loss of the drive object. As a result, the 
insistence on repetition pursues a temporality capable of 
inscribing the identity of past time, but which fails on en-
countering the difference of the present launched into the 
future. The game played by Freud’s grandson is a first at-
tempt at transmission intended to establish time and space 
in his relationship with the other.
The separation of the child from the mother, like 
the murder of the father of the primal horde in Totem and 
Taboo (Freud, 1913 / 2003a), is not an act of violence, in-
asmuch as it constructs the subject’s temporal and spatial 
representations. However, as with the totemic myth, rep-
etition will challenge the pleasure principle. The symbolic 
repetition of the real act produces the transmission of that 
experience, preventing it from turning into a violent act.
In the essay Beyond the Pleasure Principle 
(1920/2003g), Freud subverts one of the fundamental axi-
oms of psychoanalysis, according to which all dreams are 
fulfillments of wishes, even those of anguish and punish-
ment. In this sense, he wonders how the dreams of people 
who have suffered traumatic violence could at the same time 
be in accordance with the hedonistic function of the psychic 
system and recall childhood situations that caused displea-
sure. Freud replies that they obey the repetition compulsion, 
life’s tendency to retrieve an abandoned earlier time., There 
exists, therefore, an impulse to return to a lost past.
That ultimate goal, states Freud, “must be an old 
state of things, an initial state from which the living en-
tity, at one time or another, strayed away and to which it 
strives to return through the winding paths along which 
its development leads” (1920/2003g, p. 2526, italics in the 
original). From that moment on, Freud confirms a change 
he had long been contemplating. By stating that there is a 
drive characterized by the tendency to return to its previ-
ous state, he inscribes death as a goal of life.
It is a drive that aims to return to a primeval condi-
tion, inasmuch as it is marked by the effects of a violence 
that reduces and annihilates the space and memory through 
which the subject can represent himself. According to 
Lacan (1964/1985), this death drive is the side of repetition 
that insists on heading to the traumatic – to the “encounter 
with the real” – i.e., with a lack that restores the opera-
tion of the conditionings of subjectivity. Based on this new 
theory of trauma, Freud (1920/2003g) was able to explain 
the satisfaction of masochism and how it – and not sadism 
– occupies the primary position through which the subject 
will constitute himself. From the opposition between ego 
drives and sexual drives, Freud restores the dualism, now 
between death drive and life drive.
Until 1920, with the essay Beyond the Pleasure 
Principle (2003g), a sadistic component was identified with 
sexuality, while masochism was understood as the return of 
sadism to the ego itself. This scheme is that of the grammar 
of the drive, presented in 1915, as we have seen in the differ-
ence between the active voice (“I beat”), the passive voice ( 
“I am beaten”) and the reflexive voice (“I make myself be 
beaten”). But considering masochism as primordial means 
assuming that the subject arises in a position of loss of the 
drive object. And sadism reveals the activity of the subject 
in going toward that object, now reduced to passivity.
At the beginning of the drive circuit, part of the death 
drive is directed to the outside world. It is diverted by the 
sexual function to protect the ego from its own destruction 
and to perceive in the external objects another possible way 
of satisfaction. It is the active condition of sadism. But there 
is another part of the death drive that is not transferred out of 
the ego, but settles in it, taking it as its sexual object. It is a 
residue of the death drive that silently resists being connected 
to any representation. This residue of the death drive that re-
mains in the subject disconnected from sexuality preserves 
the condition of masochism of the subject in the present time.
That part of the death drive connected to the sexual 
drive that was projected outwards returns to the ego at a 
second moment. We then have what is characterized as sec-
ondary masochism, identified in the passivity of the second 
time of the drive circuit. Primary masochism, through the 
silent death drive, relates to a body condition that is never 
abandoned, that of being an object. But one must be able to 
move between this position and the position of subject not 
to settle into any discourse that may annul the conditions 
of representation of oneself. Neither as object, requiring an 
act of hatred against the other, nor as sacrificial subject, 
being the property of the other, an object of the other’s sat-
isfaction. The destruction of social ties is an inevitable con-
sequence in both cases.
Under these conditions, the subject is dispossessed 
of his word, forced to become silent and hold his tongue, 
removed from his when and where. These are situations of 
violence in which he finds himself deprived of his condi-
tions to represent himself, cast away from the social ties that 
give his existence. In face of them, we cannot depart from 
an ethic of the “duty to transmit,” an ethic of the transmis-
sion of experience directed towards recalling it symbolically 
so it is not repeated through real acts of violence.
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Tempo, violência e transmissão
Resumo: O objetivo deste artigo é apresentar, a partir da leitura de textos da teoria psicanalítica de Sigmund Freud, uma 
compreensão sobre os processos psíquicos do sujeito em uma situação de violência. Pensamos que a pulsão é a condição 
para o estabelecimento do laço entre sujeito e cultura. Quando uma situação de violência se apresenta ao sujeito, ela rompe 
com essa condição, anulando a possibilidade de ele se representar em um tempo e um espaço. Como forma de reestabelecer o 
sujeito nesse circuito pulsional que o coloca em relação com o outro, a transmissão dessa experiência de violência se apresenta 
como um dever. Essa transmissão, porém, não se faz sem a inscrição de perdas.
Palavras-chave: transmissão, violência, pulsão, tempo.
Temps, violence et transmission
Résumé: L’objectif de cet article est de présenter, à partir des textes de la théorie psychanalytique de Sigmund Freud, une 
compréhension des processus psychiques du sujet dans une situation de violence. Nous pensons que la pulsion est la condition 
pour établir le lien entre le sujet et la culture. Quand une situation de violence se présente au sujet, cette condition est rompue, 
niant sa possibilité de se représenter dans le temps et l’espace. Afin de rétablir le sujet dans ce circuit pulsionnel qui le met en 
relation avec l’autre, la transmission de l’expérience de la violence se présente comme un devoir. Cette transmission, cependant, 
ne s’inscrit pas sans pertes.
Mots-clés: transmission, violence, pulsion, temps.
Tiempo, violencia y transmisión
Resumen: Este artículo tiene el objetivo de presentar la comprensión de los procesos mentales del sujeto en una situación de 
violencia, a partir de la lectura de textos de la teoría psicoanalítica de Sigmund Freud. Creemos que la pulsión es la condición 
para establecer el vínculo entre el sujeto y la cultura. Cuando se presenta una situación de violencia al sujeto, se rompe con esta 
condición, negando la posibilidad de que él puede representarse en un tiempo y espacio. Con el fin de restablecerle en este 
circuito pulsional que le pone en relación con los demás, la transmisión de la experiencia de la violencia se presenta como un 
deber. Sin embargo, no se la inscribe sin pérdidas.
Palabras clave: transmisión, violencia, pulsión, tiempo.
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